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 * The Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016. 
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St. Thomas, VI 00802 
 Counsel on behalf of Appellee 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, a jury convicted 
Appellant Renell Lettsome on charges of second degree murder, attempted second degree 
murder, assault, and arson.  The jury also found him guilty on separate charges for the 
use of a dangerous weapon during the commission of these crimes.  The District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, Appellate Division (the 
“Appellate Division”), affirmed Lettsome’s convictions, with the exception of the 
conviction for use of a dangerous weapon during the commission of arson.  The 
Appellate Division also affirmed the Superior Court’s sentence, which aggregated 57 ½ 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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years in prison and more than $35,000 in fines, plus restitution.1  Lettsome now appeals 
the Appellate Division’s decision.2  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
The facts of this matter are recounted in great detail in the Appellate Division’s 
per curiam opinion of August 21, 2015, and will only be briefly restated here.  On 
October 29, 2005, David Geiger and his teenage son, Nathan, were attacked in their home 
in St. John, the United States Virgin Islands (“USVI”), after which their home was set on 
fire.  David was killed during the attack, and Nathan sustained serious injuries.   
Several days before the brutal murder, David Geiger discovered that $50,000 had 
been stolen from his house while Amber Taylor was house-sitting for him.  David had 
confronted Taylor, who denied any involvement in the theft.   
Two days after the murder, the Virgin Islands Police Departure (“VIPD”) 
interviewed Taylor.  She denied any involvement in either the theft or the murder.  On 
November 11, 2005, Taylor changed her story.  She told the VIPD that a man named 
Tulius Stewart over-powered her while she was house-sitting the Geiger residence and 
stole the money.  She also told law enforcement that it was Lettsome, with whom she had 
a child, who had killed David Geiger.  Lettsome was upset that David Geiger was 
                                                          
1 The overall length of Lettsome’s prison term was unaffected by the reversal of the 
conviction for the use of a dangerous weapon during the commission of arson. 
 
2 Jurisdiction to hear Lettsome’s appeal was conferred on the Appellate Division pursuant 
to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) & (b).  We have jurisdiction to review the Appellate Division’s 
decision pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). 
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harassing Taylor about the theft, and wanted to stop the harassment. 3  Based upon 
Taylor’s statements, the VIPD caused a warrant to be issued for the arrest of Lettsome. 
On November 27, 2005, Lettsome walked into a police station in the British 
Virgin Islands (“BVI”).  He was arrested on suspicion of illegal entry into the BVI.  After 
receiving a “Caution Statement” from a BVI detective and acknowledging his 
understanding of that statement,4 Lettsome proceeded to confess to the murder of David 
Geiger, the assault on Nathan, and the attempt to burn down the Geiger house.  Shortly 
after confessing to the BVI detective, Lettsome was Mirandized by officers from the 
VIPD.  In great detail, Lettsome recounted his attack on the Geigers.  He related that he 
had waited outside the Geiger home until David went to sleep, then attacked him in his 
bedroom with a metal pipe and knife.  In an attempt to fend off the attack, David bit 
Lettsome’s hand.  Evidently awakened by the altercation, Nathan entered his father’s 
bedroom.  Lettsome turned his attention to Nathan, pushing him into the kitchen and 
beating him with the pipe until he was unconscious.  Lettsome then dragged Nathan into 
the living room.  After moving Nathan to the living room, Lettsome drank from a gallon 
jug of water.  While attempting to clean up the mess that had been made, Lettsome heard 
David groan.  He returned to David’s bedroom, where he beat him with the pipe until 
David was dead.  Then, in an attempt to conceal his crimes, Lettsome obtained some 
                                                          
3 As recounted by the Appellate Division, “[s]ometime after Taylor made her statement 
the People assisted Taylor in relocating to Florida, on the ground that her safety was at 
risk . . . .”  (App. at 10.) 
 
4 The Caution Statement is similar in some respects to the Miranda warnings required in 
the United States. 
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torch fluid from a nearby golf course, covered David’s body with a mattress, and set fire 
to the house.  After he left the house, Lettsome honked his car horn to warn neighboring 
tenants of the fire.  Although the nearby tenants were able to save Nathan from the fire, 
they could not rescue David. 
After Lettsome’s confession, the VIPD officers transported him back to the USVI.   
A twelve count information was returned against Lettsome.  Count One accused 
Lettsome of first degree murder, and Count Two charged use of a dangerous weapon 
during the commission of first degree murder.  Counts Three and Four charged second 
degree murder and use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of second degree 
murder.  Counts Five through Ten concerned the assault on Nathan with a dangerous 
weapon.  Finally, Counts Eleven and Twelve charged first degree arson and the use of a 
deadly weapon during the commission of arson. 
At a pretrial conference held on March 24, 2006, the government informed the 
Court and defense counsel that they were awaiting results of a DNA examination of 
various pieces of evidence retrieved from the crime scene, including the water jug found 
at the Geiger residence.  In an order entered on May 25, 2006, the trial court scheduled a 
final pretrial conference for August 2, 2006, with jury selection set for August 4 and trial 
set for August 7, 2006.  On July 24, 2006, just two weeks before trial was set to begin, 
the prosecution filed a summary of the anticipated testimony of its DNA expert.  The 
summary indicated that blood found at the crime scene, including blood found on the 
water jug, contained DNA that matched Lettsome’s DNA.  On July 31, 2006, Lettsome 
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moved for permission to retain a DNA expert and to continue the trial.  The trial court 
granted permission to retain an expert, but refused to continue the trial. 
On the morning of jury selection, the trial court raised a concern with respect to 
the adequacy of those counts in the Information charging use of a dangerous weapon 
during the commission of the underlying crimes.  Although the Information correctly 
cited the section of the crimes code making it unlawful to use a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of a crime of violence, the Information itself failed to specifically allege use 
of dangerous weapon during the commission of a crime of violence or that the conduct 
alleged was unlawful.  The prosecution promptly moved to amend the information to 
correct the defects.  Over the defense objection, the trial court granted the motion on the 
first day of trial. 
Also prior to trial, the trial court learned that the prosecution was responsible for 
Amber Taylor’s relocation to Florida and for Lettsome’s unsuccessful attempt to have her 
testify on his behalf.  The trial court, concluding that the prosecution had engaged in 
misconduct in causing Taylor’s absence, permitted Lettsome’s counsel to craft a written 
narrative of the testimony he expected Taylor to provide.  This narrative portrayed 
Lettsome as a peaceful person and an excellent father.  The narrative related that she had 
told the police on November 11, 2005 that Lettsome was the murderer “so that [the 
police] w[ould] stop harassing and threatening [her] and because that is what [she and] 
Renell . . . had agreed to.”  (App. 1017.)  The narrative was read to the jury as Lettsome’s 
final piece of evidence.  In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of the VIPD 
police officer who had interviewed Amber Taylor on October 31 and November 11, 
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2005.  The jury was also presented with Taylor’s October 31 and November 11, 2005 
statements to the police. 
As noted above, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges with the 
exception of the first degree murder charge and the related charge of use of a dangerous 
weapon during the commission of first degree murder.  The Appellate Division affirmed 
the jury verdict with the exception of the charge of use of a dangerous weapon during the 
commission of arson.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
  Lettsome presents five arguments on appeal.  First, Lettsome contends that the 
Appellate Division erred in subjecting to harmless error review the Superior Court's 
erroneous admission of Amber Taylor's statements to law enforcement, in violation of the 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.  Lettsome also 
complains that the Appellate Division erred in its application of the harmless error rule.  
We disagree with Lettsome on both points.   
First, the Supreme Court decided thirty years ago that Compulsory Process Clause 
and Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless error review.  See Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (holding that Compulsory Process Clause violations 
are subject to harmless error review); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) 
(holding that Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless error review).  Although 
Lettsome argues that Van Arsdall has been undermined by Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), our Court, as well as every other Court of Appeals, has continued to 
apply harmless error analysis to Confrontation Clause claims.  See, e.g., Holland v. 
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Rivard, 800 F.3d 224, 243 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1328 
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1147 (10th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 78 (3d Cir. 2008).  Indeed, Lettsome has 
not cited a single case holding that a Confrontation Clause error is not subject to harmless 
error review.  We, of course, remain bound by extant Supreme Court precedent directly 
on point, even if its reasoning has been called into question by other Supreme Court 
decisions.  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling 
its own decisions.”); United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 626 n.3 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Van Arsdall is directly on point and thus controlling.  Accordingly, the Appellate 
Division did not err in concluding that any Confrontation or Compulsory Process Clause 
error was subject to harmless error review. 
Lettsome contends that even if harmless error review was appropriate, the 
Appellate Division’s harmless error analysis was insufficiently rigorous.  Again, we 
disagree.  Although the Appellate Division did not articulate the precise harmless error 
test it was applying, it did consider, as required, the totality of the record.  A 
Confrontation Clause or a Compulsory Clause violation requires an assessment of 
whether the erroneous admission of Taylor’s statements was “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.  As the Appellate Division accurately 
recounted, “Lettsome was placed at Geiger’s house by abundant forensic evidence, and 
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Lettsome confessed in detail to the crimes.”  (App. 36.)  Taylor’s second statement to the 
police merely corroborated what Lettsome had told the police.  Furthermore, Lettsome 
was able to read a statement of what he anticipated Taylor would have told the jury if she 
were present to testify, and that statement recanted her November 11th report to the 
police about Lettsome’s participation in the murder.5  Given the evidence against him, 
including his confessions and the presence of his blood and DNA at the crime scene, we 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any Sixth Amendment violation would not have 
contributed to Lettsome’s conviction.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  Thus, any 
Sixth Amendment violation was harmless. 
Second, Lettsome argues that the Appellate Division erred by affirming the trial 
court’s decision to allow the Information to be amended to correct pleading defects in the 
use of a dangerous weapon charges.  We agree, however, with the Appellate Division that 
Lettsome cannot claim he was unfairly surprised by the amendment because the charges 
indeed “cited most of the elements and referenced the appropriate statutory provision.”  
(App. 44.)  Because the amended information did not charge an “additional or different” 
offense, and because Lettsome was not unfairly surprised, Lettsome’s substantial rights 
                                                          
5 The Government contends that the “invited error” doctrine precludes Lettsome from 
challenging the admission of Taylor’s statements.  Asserting that “Lettsome 
unquestionably invited the admission of Amber Taylor’s statement when defense counsel 
helped craft the [narrative] and read it into the record,” the Government argues that the 
admission of her statements to the police cannot be the basis for reversal of the verdict.  
(Appellee’s Br. at 20.)  In view of our disposition of this issue, we need not reach the 
question of the applicability of the “invited error” doctrine. 
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were not prejudiced.  See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 765-66 
(3d Cir. 1982).  
 Third, Lettsome argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying 
Lettsome’s pretrial motion to continue.  The denial of a motion to continue “constitutes 
an abuse of discretion only when it is so arbitrary as to violate due process.”  United 
States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation omitted); Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]rial judges must 
balance the conflicting demands of court administration with the rights of the accused as 
well as those of co-defendants and others awaiting trial who would be affected by the 
consequences of a delay.”).  Here, Lettsome knew as early as March 2006 that the 
Government was awaiting results of a DNA analysis, and he also knew that the results 
were expected by late July before his trial in August.  Lettsome had ample time to move 
for his own DNA expert.  When Lettsome received the DNA analysis two weeks before 
trial, he waited a week before filing his motion for a continuance.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
denying Lettsome’s motion for a continuance. 
 Fourth, Lettsome argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
conviction for first degree arson under Virgin Islands law for two reasons.  First, he 
argues that, at the time of the attack on the Geigers, USVI law defined first degree arson 
as “maliciously burn[ing] in the night time an inhabited building in which there is at the 
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time some human being.”  V.I. Code Ann., tit. 14, § 252(a) (2005) (emphasis added).6  
Lettsome argues that, because the fire was not set until after midnight, i.e. in the “a.m.,” 
he cannot be convicted of first degree arson.  We believe, however, that the statute’s use 
of the term “night time” is to be accorded its natural and commonsense meaning, i.e. 
while it is dark outside.  See United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“The role of the courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to Congress's intent. . . .  
Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent through the ordinary meaning of 
its language, every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the 
plain language of the statute.”) (citation omitted); see also Nighttime, Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1993) (“the time 
                                                          
6 The definition of arson in the first degree was changed substantially in 2013.  One of the 
changes was to eliminate the requirement that the fire be set in the “night time.”  Section 
252(a) of V.I. Code Ann., tit. 14 now defines arson in the first degree as follows:  
 
 (a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with 
intent to destroy or damage a building, or while in the 
commission of any felony, he starts a fire or causes an 
explosion, and: 
(1) the building is inhabited or occupied, or the person has a 
reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; 
or 
(2) it is a structure where persons are normally present, such 
as: jails, prisons or detention centers; hospitals, nursing 
homes or other health care facilities; department stores, office 
buildings, business establishments, churches or educational 
institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other 
similar structures; or 
(3) any other person sustains serious physical injury as a 
result of the fire or explosion or the firefighting as a result 
thereof. 
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from dusk to dawn”).  We have not found any persuasive support for the argument that 
“night time” necessarily means before midnight.  The evidence indisputably shows that 
the fire was set between dusk and dawn, triggering application of the first degree arson 
statute.   
Lettsome also argues that he lacked the required element of “maliciousness” 
because he honked his car horn to warn other tenants of the fire.  Nonetheless, because 
Lettsome confessed to starting the fire to remove evidence of his crimes, we agree that 
there was sufficient evidence of maliciousness to convict Lettsome of first degree arson. 
 Fifth and finally, Lettsome argues that the Appellate Division erred in finding that 
his sentence of more than 57 years in prison, plus fines exceeding $35,000, violate the 
Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.  “Generally, a 
sentence within the limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment.”  United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Here, Lettsome’s sentence is within the statutory maximums.  Moreover, in light 
of the seriousness of Lettsome’s crimes, we agree with the Appellate Division that 
Lettsome’s sentence is not excessive.  Therefore, we cannot find that his sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Appellate Division’s order of August 
21, 2015.  
